This paper investigates the relationship between media bias and the in uence of the media on voting in the context of newspaper endorsements. We rst develop a simple econometric model in which voters choose candidates under uncertainty and rely on endorsements from better informed sources. Newspapers are potentially biased in favor of one of the candidates and voters thus rationally account for the credibility of any endorsements. Our primary empirical nding is that endorsements are in uential in the sense that voters are more likely to support the recommended candidate after publication of the endorsement. The degree of this in uence, however, depends upon the credibility of the endorsement. In this way, endorsements for the Democratic candidate from left-leaning newspapers are less in uential than are endorsements from neutral or right-leaning or newspapers and likewise for endorsements for the Republican. We also nd that endorsements are more in uential among moderate voters and those more likely to be exposed to the endorsement. In sum, these ndings suggest that voters do rely on the media for information during campaigns but that the extent of this reliance depends upon the degree and direction of any bias.
Introduction
Voters are often uncertain as to which candidate to support when going to the polling booth and may thus attempt to gather information regarding candidates from better informed sources. One important potential source for such information is the media, which has traditionally been viewed a key ingredient in the development of a well-functioning democracy.
While this potential role for the media in providing information to voters is widely recognized, there is also signi cant concern among voters and political commentators alike that such information may not be su ciently objective. According to recent survey data, over one-half of voters perceive that the media is politically biased in its reporting, and these perceptions of media bias have increased over time (Pew, 2005) . If voters are unsophisticated and do not adequately account for any political bias in information provided by the media, then left-leaning media sources may systematically improve electoral outcomes for Democratic candidates and likewise for right-leaning media sources and Republican candidates.
In this case, media bias may lead to poor decisions by voters in terms of selecting relatively low-quality candidates for o ce.
A key question regarding the role of the media in democracies is then whether voters are su ciently sophisticated to lter out any media bias and, correspondingly, to reduce their reliance on biased reporting when choosing between political candidates in elections. Survey questions regarding trust in the media suggest that voters do attempt to lter out media bias.
In particular, according to recent survey data, over 40 percent of respondents report that they have \hardly any con dence in the media", as opposed to \a great deal of con dence" or \some con dence" in the media. Moreover, the fraction of voters lacking con dence in the media has more than doubled over the past three decades, mirroring the recent upward trend in voter perceptions of media bias (Pew, 2005) .
These relatively low levels of media credibility are certainly suggestive that voters do attempt to lter out media bias. Yet there is little direct evidence that any reduced reliance on biased media reports is re ected in voting decisions, the ultimate political outcome. Does biased coverage have less in uence over voters than unbiased coverage? In this paper, we investigate these issues in the context of the role of newspaper endorsements in voting decisions. We begin by developing a simple econometric model in which voters have incomplete information over candidate quality and thus look to the media for guidance. Newspapers have better information than do voters but are potentially biased and may thus endorse candidates of relatively low quality if the bias is severe. Voters are rational and, when evaluating endorsements, attempt to lter out any such bias on the part of the media. The key insight of the model is that, if voters do lter out media bias, then endorsements for the Democratic candidate, say, from a left-leaning newspaper are less credible and should thus have less in uence than a similar endorsement from a neutral or a right-leaning source.
We then test this prediction regarding media bias and the in uence of the media on voting using information from daily survey data, which include individual-level data on voting intentions as well as newspaper readership, in the months leading up to the 2000 and 2004 Presidential elections. These data are combined with newspaper-level endorsement information, which includes not only the name of the endorsed candidate but also the endorsement date, which facilitates a comparison of voter intentions and preferences after the endorsement to those of similar readers before the endorsement. Our measures of endorsement credibility are derived from a statistical model, which allows us to infer the ideological leanings of each newspaper as a function of its characteristics, which includes information on newspaper ownership as well as information regarding reader preferences over candidates prior to the publication of endorsements. Using these derived credibility measures, we show that endorsements are in uential in the sense that readers are more likely to support the favored candidate after publication of the endorsement. Importantly, however, the credibility of the endorsement is the most important determinant of its in uence. In particular, we show that in uence is increasing in the credibility of the endorsement and that endorsements from extremely biased newspapers have little or no in uence. We also investigate how the in uence of endorsements varies across individuals and show that endorsements are more in uential among moderate voters and those more likely to be exposed to the endorsement. Finally, we investigate the robustness of the baseline results to several alternative speci cations. Taken together, these results suggest that voters do attempt to learn from the media when choosing between candidates in elections but, at the same time, discount information from sources that are perceived to be politically biased.
The paper proceeds as follows. We next review the relevant literature on sources and measurement of media bias and the in uence of the media on voting. We then develop an econometric model of voter learning from newspaper endorsements. After providing details on the empirical implementation of the econometric model, we describe the data, baseline empirical results, and the robustness checks. The nal section of the paper concludes.
Related Literature
This paper is related to a large literature on the political economy of the media sector. Given the size of this literature, we focus here on its two most relevant branches: the sources and measurement of media bias and the in uence of the media on voting decisions.
Sources and Measures of Media Bias
The theoretical literature in this area has focused primarily on the institutional determinants of media bias. According to the demand-side view, media outlets are primarily driven by pro t motives, as opposed to political motives. In this case, bias may arise from the preferences of consumers of the media. Under the assumption that consumers prefer news that con rms their prior beliefs, competition forces newspapers to di erentiate themselves by moving to the ideological extremes (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005) . Even if consumers prefer media outlets that deliver unbiased information, however, bias may emerge if readers use such reports to evaluate the quality of the information source. In this case, readers believe that outlets have better information if the reports conform to the prior beliefs of the reader (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006) . A related idea is that, due to the increasing-returnto-scale technology and their dependence on advertising revenue, media outlets may deliver more news to large groups and groups that are valuable to advertisers (Stromberg, 2004) .
In addition to demand-side factors as a potential source, media bias may also re ect the preferences and career concerns of journalists (Baron, 2006) , editors, or owners (Djankov et al., 2003) . If the media plays a role in monitoring the behavior of incumbents, it is possible that government capture of the media sector may lead to distortions in news coverage (Besley and Prat, 2006) . Puglisi (2006) , Snyder and Stromberg (2010) , and Larcinese, Puglisi, and Snyder (2007) provide empirical support for this view of the media as a watchdog over the actions of incumbent politicians.
The literature has also made recent strides in terms of measuring the ideological orientation of di erent media outlets. Groseclose and Milyo (2005) provide a method for measuring media bias in the news stories of several major media outlets in the U.S. They arrive at their measure by counting the citations of think tanks in the media and then comparing the citations of think tanks by Republicans or Democrats in Congress. They nd that, on average, outlets tend to be biased towards to the left. In a paper providing empirical support for the demand-side view of media bias, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) construct an index of media slant by comparing the language in newspapers to the language used by politicians in Congress. Their results suggest that newspaper slant is similar to the position that would be chosen by a pro t-maximizing rm.
There is relatively little research into the political determinants of newspaper endorsements. The exceptions to this pattern include Ansolabehere et al. (2006) , which examines newspaper endorsements between 1940 and 2002 and documents a trend away from strongly favoring Republicans in the early years of the sample towards favoring Democrats today.
They also nd that newspapers are much more likely to endorse incumbents today than in the past. Kim (2008) provides evidence that newspaper endorsements are largely driven by owner preferences, rather than reader preferences. Several studies have also documented a correlation between endorsement patterns and more general coverage of political events, such as campaigns (Kahn and Kenney, 2002) , the release of economic data (Larcinese et al., 2007) , and scandals (Puglisi and Snyder, 2008) .
Media In uence
A number of theoretical papers have investigated the e ect of the media on the behavior of rational voters with incomplete information and the role of media bias in this process. 1 According to Bray and Kreps (1987) , voters can lter out bias without being persuaded on average if voters are fully rational and media reports are continuous. On the other hand, if reports are binary, or \coarse", media reports may in uence even fully rational voters; see, for example, Baron (2006) . In this case, the model developed by Calvert (1985) demonstrates that the degree of any in uence resulting from advice depends upon the bias of the advisor.
That is, an advisor biased in favor of a given option, say x, is more in uential when advising against x than when advising in favor of x. 2
There is a large literature in political science and communications on the impact of newspaper endorsements. The vast majority of these studies have examined the cross-sectional correlation between voting behavior, based upon either aggregate voting returns or survey data, and exposure to newspaper endorsements. 3 Given this source of identi cation, it is di cult to distinguish between the in uence of endorsements and two confounding factors.
First, it is well-known that voters may choose to read newspapers with like-minded ideology.
Second, it may be the case that both newspapers and readers choose to support high-quality candidates. Two studies have attempted to overcome these challenge by using changes in voter preferences and the pattern of newspaper endorsements over time. In an analysis of voting patterns in the 1976 gubernatorial primary in Maryland, Hollander (1979) shows that support for the endorsed candidate in polling data rose just after the endorsement. While suggestive, this study is limited to a single newspaper endorsement and also does not provide tests for the statistical signi cance of this increase. In another study exploiting variation over time, Ladd and Lenz (2009) use changes in newspaper endorsements between the 1992 and 1997 elections in the United Kingdom and report that the persuasive e ects of endorsements are large.
Relative to this literature on newspaper endorsements, our paper makes three contributions. First, we attempt to address the tendency of consumers to access like-minded media outlets by collecting information on the endorsement date, which permits a pre-endorsement and post-endorsement comparison. Second, we provide theoretical foundations for measuring the in uence of the media on voting. These theoretical foundations lead to our study's third contribution, which is our attempt to distinguish between the in uence of surprising endorsements and the in uence of unsurprising endorsements. This allows us to understand whether or not voters lter out any media bias when interpreting such endorsements.
As noted above, the primary empirical challenge to detecting a causal media in uence is 3 Using survey data, Robinson (1974) nds that voters, after accounting for observed characteristcs, were more likely to support Nixon in 1972 if they read a newspaper endorsing Nixon. Krebs (1998) nds that city council candidates in Chicago received more votes if they were endorsed by the Chicago Tribute or the Sun Times. Using survey data, Goldenberg and Traugott (1981) nd that endorsements increased name recognition by voters in 1978 Congressional races. Using survey data from the 1968 Presidential election, Robinson (1976) nds that endorsements increased votes but only among those voters who did not frequently discuss politics with others. Erikson (1976) , using county-level data, nds that newspaper endorsements in the 1964 presidential elections increased the vote share of the endorsed candidate by ve percentage points. Kahn and Kenney (2002) found signi cant positive e ects of endorsements in U.S. Senate races on the comparative feeling thermometer score in National Election Survey data. Similarly, Druckman and Parkin (2005) nd that endorsements have an e ect on voting by using information from exit polls.
the tendency for consumers to choose news outlets that share similar political perspectives.
Several recent studies have made e orts in di erent ways to deal with this potential selection bias in media contexts other than newspaper endorsements. DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) identi ed the e ect of Fox News on voting behavior by looking at the introduction of Fox News Channel in a town-level analysis. They found that Fox News convinced 3 to 28 percent of its viewers to vote Republican. Gerber et al. (2009) Other studies have documented an e ect of media exposure on voter turnout, including George and Waldfogel (2006) and .
An Econometric Model of Voting and Endorsements
In this section, we derive a simple econometric model of voter learning from newspaper endorsements. Given our empirical motivations, we keep the model simple and employ speci c functional forms and distributional assumptions where necessary. It should be clear, however, that the basic logic of the model is robust to alternative modeling assumptions and does not rely on these speci c functional forms.
The model consists of two candidates (c 2 fD,Rg) competing for election, a set of voters, indexed by v, and a set of newspapers, indexed by n. Candidates can be characterized by both their ideology (i D ; i R ) as well as their quality (q D ; q R ): Without loss of generality, we assume that ideology increases as candidate positions move further to the right; that is i D < i R . Voters can also be characterized by their ideology (i v ), and, all else equal, prefer to elect the candidate with ideology closest to their own. Candidate quality, by contrast, is a characteristic that is valued by all voters and can be interpreted in a variety of ways, including political experience, integrity, or competence as an executive. More formally, we assume that voter v receives the following payo from candidate c winning the election:
where ! represents the utility weight placed upon candidate ideology.
Regarding the information structure, we assume that voters know the ideological positions of the candidates but are uncertain over relative candidate quality, which is de ned by q = q D q R . In particular, we assume that initial priors over relative quality are normally distributed with mean , which we normalize to zero, and a variance 2 q . Voters support the candidate who maximizes their expected utility.
Voters are assumed to read a single newspaper and potentially observe an endorsement from newspaper n for either the Democrat (e n = 1) or for the Republican (e n = 0): Before observing an endorsement, voter v supports the Democrat if his ideology is below the midpoint of the ideologies of the two candidates:
After observing an endorsement, voter v supports the Democrat if his ideology is below a quality-adjusted threshold :
Thus, if voters update positively with regard to the relative quality of the Democrat, then the ideological threshold for supporting the Democrat is increased, or moves further to the right.
By contrast, if voters update negatively with regard to the relative quality of the Democrat, then the ideological threshold for supporting the Democrat is decreased, or moves further to the left. In order to understand how voters update over quality following endorsements, as
represented by E(qje n ), we next present a framework for newspaper endorsements.
During the campaign, newspapers receive information regarding candidate quality and make endorsements based on this information as well as their own ideological positions. In particular, newspapers are assumed to receive an unbiased signal over relative candidate quality:
where " n is the noise in the signal and is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance 2 " : Rather than formally modelling the objectives and endorsement decisions of newspapers, we simply assume that each newspaper is associated with an exogenously given editorial position (p n ) and endorses the Democrat if the (normalized) signal of quality exceeds this threshold:
Thus, newspapers with higher values of p n lean further to the right and thus have a higher threshold for endorsing the Democratic candidate. We assume that voters know the editorial position of the newspaper (p n ) as well as the quality of the newspaper's information ( 2 " ): Returning to voter behavior, we can now evaluate how individuals attempt to infer quality from newspaper endorsements. As seen above, this inference is potentially complicated by the ideological position of newspapers. In addition, while the underlying information is continuous, the media report is discrete, and thus voters only learn that the information was above or below some newspaper-speci c threshold. 4 Accounting for any political bias by newspapers and the discrete nature of the endorsement, voters update over quality following an endorsement for the Democratic candidate as follows:
where
represents the voter's updating coe cient and is increasing in the degree of initial uncertainty ( 2 q ) but is decreasing in the degree of noise in the signal ( 2 " ): Finally, d represents the credibility of an endorsement for the Democrat from newspaper n and is de ned by:
and and are the Normal density and distribution function, respectively. 5 Given that d is monotonically increasing in p n , we can say that, due to voter ltering of media bias, an endorsement for the Democrat, say, from a left-leaning newspaper, such as the New York Times, provides less information to voters than does an endorsement from a right-leaning newspaper, such as the Washington Times. 6
Voters update in an analogous manner upon observing a Republican endorsement:
4 A similar issue arises in Grossman and Helpman (1999) , who focus on endorsements by interest groups, rather than media sources.
5 To derive these expressions, note that, if (y; z) are distributed jointly normal, then E(yjz > a) = y + y;z y ( z )= ( z ); where z = (a z )= z and y;z is the correlation between y and z. Then, note that q = = 0 and that = p 2 q + 2 " : Finally, using the fact that q; = 2 q , we have that q; = q = : 6 For the result regarding the monotonicity of the Mills ratio, see Heckman (1979) .
where the credibility of a Republican endorsement can be written as follows:
Similarly to the discussion of the credibility of Democratic endorsements, the credibility of Republican endorsements is decreasing in the degree of a newspaper's leaning to the right and such an endorsement from a left-leaning source provides more information to voters than does an endorsement from a right-leaning source.
Although we have taken editorial positions (p n ) as exogenous here, in Appendix 1 we explore two models with endogenous editorial positions, both of which follow the theoretical literature on media bias. In a demand-side model, a monopoly newspaper attempts to maximize pro ts, and the value of information to a representative consumer depends upon the editorial position. In this case, the newspaper optimally slants its coverage towards reader preferences. In a supply-side model, by contrast, newspapers have ideological preferences and attempt to increase the electoral prospects of their preferred party. In this case, editorial positions re ect owner preferences.
Empirical Application

Econometric implementation
To further develop the econometric model, we assume that voter ideology can be written as a function of observed voter characteristics (X v ), which includes a constant term, a set of xed e ects and unobserved characteristics:
where is a vector of parameters to be estimated, t is a time xed e ect, n is a newspaper xed e ect, and vt is unobserved by the econometrician. For tractability, we assume that vt is uniformly distributed, which leads to the linear probability model. In addition, we assume that newspaper editorial positions can be expressed as a function of newspaper characteristics:
Using these parameterizations, we can summarize the two{equation model as follows:
where After nt is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the endorsement by newspaper n had been published by date t. Note that the voting equation depends upon the vector of parameters from the endorsement equation ( ), which is unobserved by the econometrician, and we thus estimate the model in two stages. In the rst-stage, we estimate a Probit model in which newspaper endorsement decisions are related to newspaper characteristics (Z n ).
With the estimated parameters (b ) from this rst stage, we can then compute the Mills
, which can be interpreted as generalized residuals from a Probit model (Gourieroux et al., 1987) . Finally, we then use these generalized residuals as generated regressors in the second stage linear regression.
Given the presence of these generated regressors in the second stage, we compute the standard errors using bootstrapping techniques. In particular, we draw samples with replacement from the underlying set of newspapers and also independently draw samples with replacement from the underlying set of voters. The standard errors are based upon 200
replications. Note that this bootstrapping procedure assumes independence across voters and thus does not account for any potential clustering within newspapers. To address this issue, we also provide results below for a non-bootstrap speci cation with clustered standard errors.
Following the literature on media bias and the discussion of editorial positions in Appendix 1, our measures of newspaper characteristics (Z n ) are based upon the preferences of owners as a supply-side measure as well as the preferences of readers as a demand-side measure. To capture the preferences of owners, we include dummy variables for group-owned newspapers. 7 Regarding the demand side measures, we use the fraction of readers supporting the Democrat in our sample prior to the publication of the endorsement. For obvious reasons, we do not include the preferences of readers after the publication of the endorsement.
This use of reader intentions prior to the publication of the endorsement as a measure of credibility raises potential concerns associated with the nite sample properties of our estimator. Consider a market, for example, in which reported reader preferences for the Democrat exceed true reader preferences due to the measurement error associated with the nite sample size. If this newspaper endorses the Republican, our estimator will view this endorsement as highly credible. This endorsement will also appear to be in uential since the post-endorsement observations will tend to be pro-Republican relative to the pre-endorsement preferences. In this case, our estimator will capture both the true e ect of the endorsement and this spurious e ect induced by measurement error. On the other hand, if this newspaper endorses the Democrat, this measurement error will bias our estimator against nding any endorsement e ects. Thus, the expected direction of any measurement error associated with using pre-endorsement preferences of newspaper readers is unclear.
We address this issue in two ways. First, we have conducted a Monte Carlo analysis to provide a sense of any bias associated with the nite sample. The results of this analysis are encouraging. For sample sizes of voters and newspapers that are similar to those in our empirical analysis to follow, we nd that the bias associated with our estimator is small. If anything, the bias is negative, suggesting that any measurement error in the rst stage works against our estimator nding that endorsements are in uential. We refer the reader to Appendix 2 and Appendix Table 1 for a more complete discussion of this Monte Carlo analysis.
Second, as a robustness check, we provide below an alternative measure of credibility based upon the historical pattern of endorsements. According to this measure, an endorsement for the Democrat is more credible when it comes from a newspaper that has traditionally endorsed Republican candidates. Unlike our baseline measure, this alternative measure of credibility does not use any information regarding the preferences of pre-endorsement readers.
Data
In order to estimate the in uence of newspaper endorsements, we use voter reactions to endorsements as captured in daily survey data, which are provided by the National Annenberg Election Surveys 2000 and 2004. This survey employs a rolling cross-section design in which hundreds of voters were polled on a daily basis in the months leading up to the election.
For the purposes of our analysis, we use information from these data on the date of the interview, voting intentions, voting decisions, and the newspaper read most often. Information regarding the dates of newspaper endorsements and endorsed candidates is derived from several di erent sources, including the website Democracy in Action and various newspaper archives (Lexis-Nexis, Factiva, and the Associated Press). 9 As shown in Figure   1 , there is substantial variation in the timing of newspaper endorsements. Most newspapers published their endorsements in the editorial pages during the weekend. While many newspapers made endorsements in the weekend just before the election, some newspapers made their intentions known earlier.
In order to estimate newspaper editorial positions, which are unobserved by the econometrician, we rely on information on newspaper ownership and political preferences of readers.
Kim (2008) provided data on group ownership. Readers' preference is based on vote intention of newspaper readers prior to the publication of endorsements. As a robustness check, we also use preferences of residents in the newspaper market to measure preferences of potential readers, where newspaper markets are de ned as the area in which most of its readers reside.
Small newspapers, de ned as those with less than ten readers in the data, and newspapers that did not make an endorsement are excluded from the sample. After dropping these observations, we have 166 newspapers in 2000, 212 newspapers in 2004, and 32,014 individuals in the sample, of which twelve percent were surveyed after publication of the endorsement.
Summary statistics are presented in Table 1 . Table 2A reports our baseline results from estimation of the rst-stage endorsement equation.
Baseline Results
As shown, the preferences of readers, which is based upon the pre-endorsement preferences in the survey, has a strong and statistically signi cant e ect on newspaper endorsement decisions. In addition, newspapers that are owned by Cox Newspapers, Gannett, Knight Ridder,
McClatchy Newspapers, and the New York Times Company are more likely to endorse Given that the data do not have precise information on the timing of voting among early voters, we do not know whether or not the vote choice was made before or after the endorsement. Given this limitation, we thus exclude early voters from the sample.
9
The Democracy in Action website of newspaper endorsements is available at http://www.gwu.edu/~action/natendorse5.html. mocratic candidates. These results are consistent with Kim (2008) , who shows that four out of ve of these groups tend to contribute more to Democratic candidates than to Republican candidates. The results also demonstrate that newspapers were more likely to endorse the Democrat during the 2004 campaign, relative to 2000 campaign.
Using these coe cients, we can then compute the predicted probability of an endorsement for either the Democrat or the Republican, and these predicted probabilities are then converted into credibility measures. As shown in Table 3 , there is signi cant variation in the predicted probability of an endorsement for the Democrat in 2000 among the largest newspapers in the United States. At one extreme, the Dallas Morning News is predicted to endorse the Democrat with just 17 percent probability, re ecting the Republican orientation of local readers. At the other extreme, the New York Times is predicted to endorse the Democrat with 90 percent probability, re ecting the left-leaning predispositions among readers as well as its ownership by the New York Times Company. According to our estimates, Washington Post, which is predicted to endorse the Democrat with 54 percent probability, is the least biased in this set of large newspapers.
Before turning to the second-stage estimates, we rst provide graphical evidence regarding the in uence of endorsements. To provide a simple test for whether or not endorsements are in uential on average, Figure 2 depicts trends in support for the Democratic candidate among readers separately for newspapers endorsing the Democrat and for newspapers endorsing the Republican in the two weeks surrounding the endorsement. As shown, for all newspapers, there does seem to be a slight widening in the gap between readers of Democratendorsing newspapers and readers of Republican-endorsing newspapers after publication of the endorsement. The e ect is relatively small, however, and is somewhat di cult to detect.
As evidence regarding the prediction that endorsement in uence depends upon its credibility, we next split the sample into readers of newspapers with high-credibility endorsements and readers of newspapers with low-credibility endorsements. As shown in Figure 3 , which focuses on high-credibility, or surprising, endorsements, there appears to be an immediate and signi cant e ect of the endorsement on reader voting intentions. In Figure 4 , by contrast, which focuses on low-credibility, or unsurprising endorsements, the e ect is again small and di cult to visually detect. These results suggest that high-credibility endorsements do have more in uence than do low-credibility endorsements, and we turn next to a more formal econometric examination of this hypothesis.
As shown in column 1 of Table 2B , which presents our second-stage results based upon our rst-stage estimates of credibility, we nd support for the idea that endorsement credibility is a key determinant of the in uence of the endorsement, as the coe cient on our credibility measure is positive and statistically signi cant. Regarding the other controls, we also nd that voters who are older or black are more likely to vote for Democrats and voters who complete high school, relative to high school dropouts, who are male, who attend religious services or consider themselves born-again Christians are more likely to vote for the Republican.
To provide a sense of the magnitude of this e ect of endorsements and endorsement credibility, the nal column of Table 3 One limitation of the baseline results in column 1 of Table 2B is that they combine both the e ects of endorsements and the credibility of endorsements into a single coe cient. One could interpret the credibility measures as econometric weights, where the estimator places more weight on high-credibility endorsements and less weight on low-credibility endorsements. Given this interpretation, we next estimate an unweighted model as a rst attempt to separate these two e ects. In this model, we implicitly assume that voters do not lter out bias. In this case, newspaper editorial positions do not matter, and every endorsement has the same credibility and thus the same in uence. In particular, we estimate a linear probability model in which we include only the endorsement dummy variable (e n ):
As shown in column 2 of Table 2B , the coe cient is small and statistically insigni cant, suggesting that only high-credibility endorsements have in uence and that, on average, endorsements have only a small e ect.
To explore this issue further, we also estimate a speci cation in which we separately control for the credibility of the endorsement and a simple endorsement dummy:
If ltering is complete, as is assumed in our baseline speci cation, then the credibilityweighted measure should have all of the explanatory power and = and = 0: If voters do not lter, by contrast, then the credibility measure should have no e ect ( = 0) and the e ect of the endorsement, which is common across newspapers, is summarized by the coe cient on the simple endorsement dummy ( > 0):
10 These percentages are somewhat higher than other estimates of newspaper readership. In a survey conducted by Pew Research Center, 65% of respondents said that they read newspapers. According the circulation data published in Editor and Publisher Year Book, the circulation rate is around 20% in the United States. This gure is not directly comparable to our survey data, however, given that there are three people per household on average, and a newspaper may be read by more than one member of the household.
Whether or not voters lter out bias has important implications for whether or not the media can systematically in uence voters and favor one party over another. To see this, de ne the ex-post in uence of the endorsement as follows: = Pr(vote DjAfter = 1) Pr(vote DjAfter = 0) = [e n d (p n ) (1 e n ) r (p n )]+ (2e n 1) (16) The ex-ante in uence, before the endorsement decision is made, is then de ned naturally by E( ). Given the de nitions of the Mills ratio and the fact that Pr(e n = 1) d (p n ) =Pr(e n = 0) r (p n ) = (p n ), the rst term vanishes when taking expectations, and we have that:
Thus, in the absence of ltering ( > 0), biased media outlets have systematic in uence, and the Democratic candidate is advantaged if the outlet is biased to the left (Pr(e n = 1) > 0:5) and likewise for the Republican candidate if the outlet is biased to the right (Pr(e n = 1) < 0:5). With complete ltering, by contrast, = 0, and the media cannot have systematic in uence due to the sophistication on the part of voters.
As shown in column 3 of Table 2B , our results support the notion of complete ltering, relative to no ltering, as the coe cient on the simple endorsement dummy variable is now negative and statistically insigni cant. The coe cient on the credibility measure, by contrast, is positive, larger in magnitude than that in column 1, and is highly statistically signi cant. Taken together, these results support the view of complete ltering over that of no ltering and suggest that voters are su ciently sophisticated such that any media bias cannot systematically bene t one party over another.
Alternative Explanations
In Tables 5 and 6 , we explore three alternative explanations for our results. The rst alternative explanation involves di erential trends among readers of di erent types of newspapers.
For example, if Republican readers become more likely to support the Republican candidate during the campaign and Democratic readers become more likely to support the Democratic candidate, then, under the assumption that newspapers with Republican readers tend to endorse Republican candidates, we would expect more readers to move towards the endorsed candidate after the endorsement even if the endorsement has no in uence at all. While our baseline model includes day xed e ects, which account for national trends, we have no controls for local trends.
We address this rst alternative explanation in three ways. First, in column 1 of Table   5 , we present results that include newspaper-speci c trends. This adds a large number of additional parameters to be estimated, and, as shown, the key coe cient is now only signi cant at the 90-percent level. In the second column, we allow for di erent trends by voter ideology, which we measure using self-reported ideology. In particular, we allow for separate trends for each of ve ideology categories: very conservative, conservative, moderate, liberal, very liberal. As shown, the results are similar to those in the baseline speci cation.
Finally, in column 3, we include interactions between our credibility measure and date xed e ects. This speci cation allows for di erential trends across newspapers, and, in this case, identi cation is driven largely by the timing of newspaper endorsements. 11 As shown, the coe cient is larger than in the baseline results. The standard error, however, is also larger, re ecting the large number of additional parameters to be estimated, and the coe cient is thus statistically insigni cant at conventional levels. Table 5 , we exclude those readers least likely to be in uenced by an endorsement, very liberal and very conservative voters, and nd that the result is similar to the baseline. Next, in column 5, we focus exclusively on moderate readers, which is less than half of the sample. As shown, the e ect is much stronger here than in the baseline result, and the coe cient remains signi cant at the 95-percent level.
A third alternative explanation involves the timing of endorsements. For example, suppose that a candidate visits a city on a campaign stop and that this visit attracts both voters and the endorsement from the local newspaper shortly after the visit. In this case, we would expect to see support for the endorsed candidate rise after the endorsement even if the endorsement itself has no in uence. To address this issue, we examine the timing of newspaper endorsements. In particular, Table 6 
Who is in uenced?
Our baseline regressions control for individual characteristics but do not examine how the in uence of endorsements varies across voters. While we did demonstrate in Table 5 that moderate voters, relative to extreme voters, are more in uenced, we next investigate more fully the cross-voter heterogeneity in the impact of endorsements.
There are at least two underlying reasons for variation in the degree of in uence across voters. First, some voters are more likely to read the newspaper on the endorsement date and are thus more likely to be exposed to the endorsement. While our sample is solely based upon newspaper readers, there is substantial heterogeneity in the intensity of such readership. In particular, only one-half of respondents in our sample report to read the paper seven days per week with the remainder reading less than seven days. Second, conditional on being exposed to the endorsement, some voters, such as those who do not have a strong ideological attachment to one of the political parties, may be more in uenced than others.
As shown in column 1 of Table 7 , we nd that low-frequency-readers, de ned as those reading the paper less than seven days per week, are less likely to be in uenced by an endorsement, relative to high-frequency readers, de ned as those reading the paper seven days per week. While this di erence is not statistically signi cant at conventional levels, the e ects of endorsements are only statistically signi cant for high-frequency readers and are insigni cant for low-frequency readers. 12
To investigate sources of heterogeneity above and beyond exposure, we next include this proxy for exposure along with interactions with our standard demographics. As shown in column 2 of Table 7 , we nd that endorsements are less in uential for Born Again Christians and more in uential for older voters. This rst nding may re ect the fact that these religious voters tend to more less moderate. While 42 percent of other voters self-identify as moderate in our data, only 34 percent of Born Again Christians do so. Recall that, as shown in Table   5 , extreme voters are less in uenced by endorsements. Regarding the nding regarding older voters, we nd no strong ideological di erences between older and younger voters. 13
Another possible explanation for this nding is that our measure of exposure does not account for the fact that, conditional upon reading the paper on a given day, older readers, relative to younger readers, spend more time reading the editorial section. According to the National Newspaper Association of America (2008), 60 percent of older readers, de ned as those over age 64, read the editorial section. By contrast, only 12 percent of young readers, de ned as those between 18 and 24 years of age, report reading the editorial section. 14 Thus, even among seven-day readers, older voters may be more likely to be exposed to endorsements, which are published in the editorial section. Our data unfortunately do not include information on section readership, and we thus cannot provide formal support for this hypothesis.
Taken together, these results demonstrate that newspaper endorsements are more in u-ential among moderate readers than among extreme readers and among those more likely to be exposed to the endorsement.
Alternative credibility measures
In this section, we provide results using alternative credibility measures. We rst develop alternative measures of the surprise of the endorsement. Recall that our baseline credibility measure is based upon the generalized residual from a non-linear Probit model, which is the basis for our rst-stage analysis:
We next provide a surprise measure based upon residuals from linear models:
Recalling that the probability of an endorsement for the Democrat is given by 1 ( Z n ); this alternative measure captures the notion that the larger this probability, the less surprising is an endorsement for the Democrat. Likewise, the surprise of an endorsement for the Republican is decreasing in absolute value in the probability of an endorsement for the Republican, which is given by ( Z n ): 15 Column 1 of Table 8 provides results using this alternative surprise measure. As shown, the coe cient on this alternative credibility measure has the expected positive sign and remains statistically signi cant.
Returning to our baseline credibility measure, we next provide results using data from the historical endorsement patterns of newspapers. Note that with a su ciently long panel of newspaper endorsements, one can approximate the probability that newspaper n endorses the Democrat (1 (p n )) by the frequency with which the newspaper actually endorses the Democrat (f n ): Inverting this probability, we can then uncover the newspaper's editorial position as follows:
Finally, this measure of editorial position can be plugged into the credibility measures d (p n ) and r (p n ): To implement this idea, we use historical endorsement data from Editor and Publisher as provided by Kim (2008) . These data include endorsements in the 10 Presidential elections between 1960 and 1996. Note that the response rate to the Editor and Publisher survey is relatively low, and the median newspaper has endorsement information for only 5 out of the 10 elections. For the 2000 endorsements, we calculate f n as the fraction of endorsements for the Democrat between 1960 and 1996, and, for the 2004 endorsements, we calculate f n as the fraction of endorsements for the Democrat between 1960 and 2000. For newspapers that exclusively endorse one party in the historical data (f n = 0 or f n = 1), we cannot calculate editorial positions as outlined above, and we thus exclude these cases from the analysis. As shown in column 2, the coe cient is quite similar to that in the baseline speci cation and remains signi cant at the 90-percent level. Given the incomplete response rate, we focus in column 3 on the set of newspapers with a relatively complete history, those with more than 5 endorsements in the Editor and Publisher data, and, as shown, the results are stronger and the key coe cient is statistically signi cant at the 95-percent level.
The nal two columns of Table 8 combine these two alternative credibility measures.
In particular, we employ a measure of the surprise of the endorsement based upon linear residuals and the historical patterns of newspaper endorsements:
Relative to the previous speci cation based upon historical endorsement patterns, this speci cation has the advantage of using all of the newspapers with an endorsement history in our data. That is, we no longer need to exclude those newspapers that exclusively endorse one party in the historical data. As shown in column 4, the key coe cient based upon a speci cation using all newspapers is positive but is statistically insigni cant. As shown in column 5, however, when we use the subsample of newspapers with more than ve historical endorsements, the key coe cient is strong and statistically signi cant. We next include individual controls for self-reported party a liation, which include Republican, Democrat, and Independent, and self-reported ideology categories, which include very conservative, conservative, moderate, liberal, and very liberal. We decided to not include these measures as controls in the baseline regressions since these could potentially be in uenced by the endorsements. Since readers may be concerned about omitted variable bias, however, we next include these as controls in a robustness check. As shown in column 4, the key coe cient is somewhat smaller in magnitude, relative to the baseline coe cient in Table 2B , but remains positive and statistically signi cant.
Additional Robustness Checks
Finally, in column 5, we provide results with standard errors that are clustered at the newspaper level. As mentioned above, the bootstrapping procedure does not account for any potential clustering, and we thus investigate this issue in a non-bootstrapped set of results.
As shown, the standard error is slightly larger when correcting for clustering than in the baseline results, those in Table 2B , but the key coe cient remains statistically signi cant.
Taken together, the robustness checks reported here tend to support the baseline results and provide further evidence that readers are responsive to credible endorsements.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the in uence of newspaper endorsements on voting patterns in the 2000 and 2004 U.S. Presidential elections. We rst develop a simple econometric model in which voters are uncertain over candidate quality and turn to newspaper endorsements for information about the candidates. Newspapers, however, are potentially biased in favor of one of the candidates, and voters thus rationally account for the credibility of any endorsements. Our primary nding is that endorsements are in uential in the sense that voters are more likely to support the recommended candidate after publication of the endorsement.
The degree of this in uence, however, depends upon the credibility of the endorsement. In this way, endorsements for the Democratic candidate from left-leaning newspapers are less in uential than are endorsements from neutral or right-leaning newspapers and likewise for endorsements for the Republican candidate. Endorsements are also more in uential among moderate voters and those more likely to be exposed to the endorsement. Taken together, these results suggest that voters are sophisticated and attempt to lter out any bias in media coverage of politics.
Appendix 1: Endogenous Editorial Positions
We have considered two theoretical models with endogenous editorial positions. The rst model follows a literature on demand-side bias. Newspapers are assumed to be pro tmaximizing rms and attempt to maximize the value of information to a representative consumer with ideology i v : Among other interpretations, this objective could re ect a desire to charge a maximal price or to bundle the maximum amount of advertising. Finally, we assume that newspapers can commit to an editorial position. Without loss of generality,
The value of information in this case (V ) is the possibility of an endorsement for R:
The rst term is negative and represents the cost of voting against one's prior. The second term represents the value of information. In this case, it is straightforward to show that the editorial position that maximizes the value of information to the representative consumer is linearly increasing in the ideology of the voter (i v ) :
This result is similar to that in Suen (2004) , who examines similar issues in the context of a binary quality measure.
The second model follows a literature on supply-side bias. Newspaper owners are citizens with ideological preferences (i n ) and wish to manipulate voting decisions of a representative voter. We look for an informative equilibrium in which the newspaper endorses according owner preferences, and the voter chooses to follow the endorsement even if it requires voting against his prior. In this case, the newspaper prefers the Democrat after receiving the signal if:
Using the fact that E(qj n ) = 2 q 2 q + 2 n under Bayesian updating, we have that the editorial position is thus increasing in the ideology of the editor (i n ):
In order for this to be an informative equilibrium, the representative voter must follow the endorsement even if it goes against his prior. This requires that the newspaper's information is of su ciently high quality and that the preferences of the reader and owner are su ciently aligned.
Appendix 2: Monte Carlo Analysis
Recall that our estimator is based upon the following two-equation system:
In our Monte Carlo analysis, we measure newspaper preferences based only upon the preendorsement fraction of readers favoring the Democrat. Consistent with the data, readers are assumed to be surveyed prior to the endorsement with 90 percent probability. That is, Pr(After nt = 0) = 0:9: We abstract from other timing issues, and thus, in terms of timing, voters can be characterized simply as either before or after the endorsement. Reader preferences depend upon a market-speci c ideology, which is drawn from the uniform distribution over the interval [-0.5,0.5], and individual ideology, which is also drawn from the uniform distribution over the interval [-0.5,0.5]. Pre-endorsement readers support the Democrat if the sum of market ideology and reader ideology is less than zero. Endorsements depend upon the pre-endorsement fraction of readers supporting the Democrat as well as the signal over quality ( n ), which is assumed to be distributed standard normal. Post-endorsement readers account for both ideology and also for the newspaper endorsement according to the above model.
In terms of the parameters, we set the weight on reader preferences equal to one ( = 1) and consider values for equal to 0, 0.1, and 0.2. We also set the number of newspapers, or markets, equal to 400, which is similar to that in the data. In terms of the number of readers per newspaper, we choose values below, equal to, and above those in the data, which is roughly 80. In particular, we estimate models with 40, 80, and 160 readers. Finally, we use 1,000 simulations of the model for each speci cation.
As shown in Appendix Table 1 , the bias associated with our estimator is small and, with the exception of the speci cation with =0.2; tends to decline in the size of the sample. If anything, the bias seems to be in the negative direction, suggesting that any nite sample bias will work against nding any in uence of endorsements. Also, the mean square error is declining in the number of readers in all three cases. Standard errors in parentheses; * denotes 90% significance; ** denotes 95% significance; *** denotes 99% significance. a Default Category: Newspapers not owned by group owners. Companies own more than 10 newspapers in the sample are defined as group owner of newspapers. b Newspapers with the same name in different years are treated as different newspapers. Other control variables are included. Standard errors in parentheses; * denotes 90% significance; ** denotes 95% significance; *** denotes 99% significance. 
